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THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ASSOCIATION v. BRAND X INTERNET SERVICES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the ten years since the Telecommunications Act of 19961 was signed 
into law, technology in the telecommunications industry has exploded.  New 
technologies have supplanted old technologies, and further complicating 
matters, technologies and platforms have merged.2  This has made it difficult 
for the Federal Communications Commission (the Commission) and the courts 
to determine how the Act applies to new technology in the telecommunications 
field.3  Though some scholars have argued that the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 is outdated and should be revised by Congress,4 the fact remains that 
 
 1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615b (2000). 
 2. See Kevin Werbach, Breaking The Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the 
Digital Age, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 61 (2005) (noting that historical distinctions 
between communications networks are melting away due to convergence). 
 3. Former Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael Powell has stated: 
[The Commission is] increasingly being asked to answer questions that are not really 
questions, but identification of issues.  The FCC is in essence being asked to write the 
new rule.  Even when it is interpreting a rule in a statute, rarely is the statute offering 
anything clear.  So even if you are just fighting over ambiguity, you are really writing new 
law. . . . This is beginning to be a warning sign to the Congress because something has to 
be changed . . . because more and more of the agency is being forced to do the Congress’ 
job and the organic statute is losing its applicability and relevance. 
Michael K. Powell, The Digital Migration: Toward a New Telecom Act, 4 J. TELCOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 5, 14–15 (2005).  Powell has also stated that the current Telecommunications Act is 
“broken,” and that as the statute becomes more ambiguous, interpreting the statute becomes more 
politicized.  Id. at 21. 
 4. Konrad L. Trope & Paula K. Royalty, Current Legal Issues Surrounding the Regulation 
of Voice Over Internet Protocol, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., May 2004, at 10, 13 (“If consumers and 
providers alike want the courts to provide consistent decisions, then Congress may need to 
approach a complete overhaul of the Communications Act. . . . [T]he FCC, at the moment, are 
‘stuck’ with applying potentially outdated definitions, codified in the Communications Act, to 
rapidly changing technological paradigms.”); see also Jared S. Dinkes, Rethinking the Revolution: 
Competitive Telephony In a Voice Over Internet Protocol Era, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 833, 838 (2005) 
(arguing that “the future of telephony must not lie within the regulatory framework of the 
past. . . . [I]t is time for a new act addressing the realities of the telecommunications industry.”); 
Powell, supra note 3, at 21 (proposing that instead of rewriting the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Congress should draft a separate statute dedicated to the regulation of Internet Protocol).  
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until Congress acts, the Commission and the courts must wrestle with the 
statutory language they have been given.  As a result, the statutory approach 
chosen by the courts to interpret the Telecommunications Act plays an 
important role for the future of the telecommunications industry.  This was 
demonstrated in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand 
X Internet Services (Brand X).5 
In September of 2000, the Commission initiated a rulemaking proceeding 
to determine whether cable companies that offer broadband Internet service 
should be subject to regulation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.6  
The Commission was faced with the issue of whether, according to the 
language of the Act, cable modem service was a “telecommunications 
service,” which is subject to regulation, or an “information service,” which is 
not subject to regulation.7  In March of 2002, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that cable modem service providers were not subject to regulation 
because they offer an information service, not a telecommunications service.8  
Subsequently, in Brand X, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the 
Commission’s ruling.9 
In Brand X, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the 
Commission’s conclusion that cable modem service providers are “information 
service” providers and not “telecommunications service” providers was a 
lawful construction of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.10  The Court held 
 
Congress has recently proposed a bill that would lift regulations of the Telecommunications Act 
for broadband technology, which suggests that the legislature favors deregulation.  See Martha 
McKay, Verizon Praises Broadband Bill; Plan Would Lift Regulations of Telecommunications 
Act, THE RECORD, July 28, 2005, at B1 (arguing that “silos of regulation” have hampered the 
growth of broadband). 
 5. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 6. Id. at 977. 
 7. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4799–800 (2002) [hereinafter Declaratory Ruling]. 
 8. Id. at 4802. 
 9. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had previously 
overturned the Commission’s statutory construction.  Brand X Internet Servs. v. Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Court of Appeals held that the Commission 
could not permissibly construe the Telecommunications Act to exempt cable companies 
providing Internet service from regulation.  Id.  However, rather than analyzing the Commission’s 
statutory construction under Chevron, the Court of Appeals based its decision on the stare decisis 
effect of AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the court held that cable 
modem service was subject to regulation.  Id. 
 10. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974. 
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that the Chevron doctrine11 applied, that the statute was ambiguous, and that 
the Commission’s interpretation was reasonable.12 
In deciding that the Act was ambiguous, the Court looked at the ordinary 
meaning and regulatory history of the relevant statutory language.13  However, 
rather than relying on ordinary meaning and regulatory history to interpret the 
Telecommunications Act, the better approach is to interpret the 
Telecommunications Act dynamically.  A dynamic approach is best because in 
addition to statutory text and legislative history and purpose, it considers 
current context and understandings.  This is particularly important for the 
telecommunications industry, where old technology and old understandings of 
the Act quickly become obsolete. 
Part II of this casenote introduces the background of the Brand X decision, 
including the case’s factual background, the relevant statutory provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act, the Commission’s ruling, the Court’s analysis, and 
the dissent’s analysis.  Part III critiques the Court’s reasoning and suggests 
alternative statutory approaches, including purposivism, originalism, and 
dynamism.  This casenote concludes by explaining that dynamism is the best 
approach for interpreting the Telecommunications Act because in the 
telecommunications field, where technology is constantly evolving, the 
meaning of the Telecommunications Act necessarily changes over time.  As 
such, its application and interpretation should reflect this change. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
1. Internet Technology 
In an effort to attract new customers, companies that provide 
telecommunications and Internet service are constantly improving 
 
 11. The Chevron doctrine provides that unless a statute is unambiguous, courts must defer to 
the agency’s interpretation as long as it is a reasonable policy choice.  Id. at 982; Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 12. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981. 
 13. Id. at 989. 
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technology.14  However, with new technology comes questions of how to 
regulate it.15 
When the Internet was first introduced to the public, it was offered in the 
form of “dial-up” service.  When a consumer uses dial-up service, his 
computer modem “dials-up” an Internet service provider (ISP) and connects to 
the ISP via local telephone wires.  The ISP then links the consumer’s computer 
to the Internet.  Most ISPs that offer dial-up services are “non-facilities based” 
ISPs, meaning they do not own the facilities that transmit the data, i.e., the 
telephone wires and interconnection devices.  America Online is an example of 
a non-facilities based ISP.  Dial-up connections transmit data slowly because 
of the technological limitations of local telephone wires.16  Thus, dial-up has 
been known as “narrowband,” in reference to the narrower capabilities of the 
data communication wires.17  Dial-up is regulated by the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.18 
Broadband Internet technology allows much higher data transfer speeds 
than dial-up.19  There are two principal types of broadband services: cable 
modem service, which is offered over cable networks, and Digital Subscriber 
Line (DSL), which is offered over telephone lines.  For cable modem service 
and DSL, cable companies and telephone companies, respectively, can act as 
ISPs themselves or can lease their transmission facilities to non-facilities based 
ISPs. 
 
 14. New technology allows broadband Internet access to be offered over wide-area wireless 
networks, fiber-optic cable, powerlines, and Ka-band satellite.  See Brief for Wash. Legal Found. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2–4, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Nos. 04-277, 04-281); see also Angele A. Gilroy & Lennard 
G. Kruger, Cong. Res. Serv., Broadband Internet Access: Background and Issues, at 2–4 (Dec. 5, 
2003), available at  http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/tech/tech/broadband.pdf (explaining new 
broadband technology). 
 15. For a discussion of “broadband over power lines” and a proposal for its regulation, see 
generally Erik S. Johnson, “It’s Electric!”: An Argument for Certainty and Parity in Regulation 
to Welcome the New Age of Broadband Delivery—Broadband Over Power Lines, 39 GA. L. REV. 
1401 (2005). 
 16. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
 19. In 2004, “President Bush set a national goal of making affordable broadband available to 
all Americans by 2007,” but as of April 2005, “the United States had slipped from 13th to 16th 
place among nations globally in broadband penetration.”  Bill Owens, Broaden Broadband: U.S. 
Losing Ground to Other Countries on High-Speed Internet Access, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 
14, 2005, at E2.  For the benefits of broadband technology, see Brief for the Respondents States 
and Consumer Groups in Opposition to Petitioners, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs. at 1–2, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Nos. 04-277, 04-281).  See also Gilroy & Kruger, 
supra note 14, at 1–2 (explaining why broadband is important). 
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Currently, DSL is subject to regulation under the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996,20 which means that DSL providers, i.e., telephone companies, must 
provide access to their facilities, charge reasonable fees for such access, 
interconnect their facilities, and contribute to the universal service fund.21  The 
primary justification for the regulation of DSL is that historically, “the 
telephone network was the primary, if not exclusive, means through which 
information service providers can gain access to their customers.”22 
Unlike dial-up and DSL, cable modem service is not subject to regulation.  
The decision not to regulate cable companies was made by the Commission23 
in In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities24 (the Declaratory Ruling).  This decision not to regulate cable 
modem service providers has serious implications for the future of the 
telecommunications field, including growth, competition, pricing, accessibility, 
and innovation.25 
2. The Parties in Brand X 
The petitioners to the Supreme Court in Brand X were the parties opposed 
to regulation of cable modem service.26  The petitioners included the 
Commission, cable companies, telecommunications companies, and 
telecommunications associations.27  The respondents included the parties in 
 
 20. But see In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireline Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3030, ¶ 20  (2002) (stating that the Commission has 
tentatively concluded that DSL service provided by facilities-based telephone companies should 
be classified solely as an information service). 
 21. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202, 251, 254 (2000). 
 22. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005) 
(quoting Declaratory Ruling, supra note 7, at 4825, ¶ 44) (emphasis omitted). 
 23. The Commission is the administrative body authorized to interpret the 
Telecommunications Act.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201(b) (2000). 
 24. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 7, at 4798. 
 25. Werbach, supra note 2, at 60 (stating that “[d]ecisions about telecommunications policy 
are crucial.”). 
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. See Brief for the Federal Petitioners at II, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Nos. 04-277, 04-281).  The entire list of petitioners 
included: Brand X Internet LLC, the National League of Cities, the National Association of 
Telecommunications Officers and Advisors, the United States Conference of Mayors, the 
National Association of Counties, the Texas Coalition of Cities for Utility Issues, Earthlink, Inc., 
Verizon Internet Solutions d/b/a Verizon.net, Center for Digital Democracy, People of the State 
of California ex rel. Bill Lockyer, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, 
Buckingham Township, Conestoga Township, East Hempfield Township, Martic Townships, and 
Providence Township.  Id. 
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favor of regulation of cable modem service, such as non-facilities based ISPs, 
telecommunications companies, and public interest groups.28 
In general, the petitioners did not want regulation because they did not 
want to be required to offer access to non-facilities based ISPs, which would 
hinder their competitive advantage.29  The respondents, on the other hand, 
wanted regulation because it would allow them to access the cable companies’ 
transmission facilities, which would allow them to offer cable modem 
service.30 The respondents argued that this would benefit consumers by 
increasing competition, which would decrease price.31 
B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
In Brand X, the two relevant statutory definitions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 were “telecommunications service” and 
“information service.”32  The Act defines “telecommunications service” as “the 
offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of 
the facilities used.”33  According to the Act, “telecommunications” is “the 
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of 
the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information 
as sent and received.”34  The Act defines “information service” as “the offering 
 
 28. See id. at II–III.  The entire list of respondents included: National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association, SBC Communications Inc., World-Com, Inc., Cox 
Communications, Inc., AT&T Corp., Competitive Telecommunications Association, Vermont 
Public Service Board, the Information Technology Association of America, Focal 
Communications Corporation, Charter Communications, Inc., Vermont Public Service Board, the 
State of Vermont, the Vermont Department of Public Service, the Utility, Cable & 
Telecommunications Committee of the City Council of New Orleans, Association of 
Communications Enterprises, Time Warner, Inc., Time Warner Cable, the City and County of 
San Francisco, BellSouth Corporation, and BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.  Id. 
 29. See Brief for the Federal Petitioners, supra note 27; Brief for Wash. Legal Found. as 
Amici Curaie Supporting Petitioners, supra note 14. 
 30. See Brief for the Respondents States and Consumer Groups in Opposition to Petitioners, 
supra note 19. 
 31. There are strong arguments for both sides of the debate.  See generally RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 279–318 (1998); Brief of AARP, Free Press and 
Nat’l Internet Alliance, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7–21, Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Nos. 04-277, 04-281) 
(arguing in favor of regulation).  But see Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 14, Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Nos. 04-277, 04-281) 
(arguing against regulation).  The Court’s ultimate holding was seen by some as a “win for cable 
companies and a loss for consumers” due to decreased competition.  Supreme Court Decision 
Seen As Boon to Cable Companies, ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP. (July 12, 
2005). 
 32. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005). 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). 
 34. § 153(43) (emphasis added). 
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of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, 
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications.”35 
The Act regulates telecommunications service providers as common 
carriers, but does not regulate information service providers as common 
carriers.36  Every “telecommunications carrier”—defined to mean “any 
provider of telecommunications services”—is “treated as a common carrier . . . 
to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”37  
As a result, telecommunications service providers are subject to several 
regulations that information service providers are not.38  Like other common 
carriers, a telecommunications carrier is required “to furnish such 
communication service upon reasonable request therefor”39 and may not 
discriminate in its sales of telecommunications services.40  
Telecommunications carriers are also required to interconnect their facilities41 
and to contribute to the federal “universal service” fund.42  Meanwhile, when a 
communications service constitutes an “information service,” it is 
presumptively unregulated.43 
C. The Commission’s Interpretation 
In the Declaratory Ruling, the Commission conceded that cable modem 
service had a telecommunications component, but ultimately determined that 
cable modem service providers did not “offer” this telecommunications 
component because the telecommunications component of cable modem 
service was fully integrated and inseparable from the information service 
component.44  First, the Commission addressed whether cable modem service 
is an information service.45  The Commission found that cable modem service 
providers offered customers Internet functionality services, like access to e-
 
 35. § 153(20). 
 36. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975. 
 37. § 153(44). 
 38. Although the regulation of common carriers is mandatory, “the Commission must 
forbear from applying [the provisions] if it determines that the public interest requires it.”  Brand 
X, 545 U.S. at 976 (citing Telecommunications Act §§ 160(a), (b)). 
 39. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
 40. § 202. 
 41. § 251. 
 42. § 254. 
 43. Although the Commission determined that cable modem service providers did not offer a 
telecommunications component and therefore “declined to apply mandatory Title II common-
carrier regulation to cable companies, it invited comment on whether under its Title I jurisdiction 
it should require cable companies to offer other ISPs access to their facilities on common-carrier 
terms.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979. 
 44. Declaratoy Ruling, supra note 7, at 4822–23, ¶ 40. 
 45. Id. at 4820–21, ¶¶ 34–35. 
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mail and use of the cable company’s Domain Name Service (DNS), which 
allows customers to browse the World Wide Web and to transfer files on the 
Internet.46  The Commission held that these services were information services 
because they involved the manipulation of information.47  In particular, the 
Commission found that DNS matched a third-party Web-site address with the 
IP address of the third party’s host server.48  This suggested to the Commission 
that the viewing of third party Web-sites involved the alteration of information 
by the cable company’s DNS.49  Thus, the Commission concluded that DNS 
was an information service.50  It was because of DNS and the other Internet 
functionality services that the Commission determined that cable modem 
service providers offered an information service.51 
Next, the Commission addressed whether, in addition to information 
services, cable modem service providers offered telecommunications.52  The 
Commission conceded that the physical connection to the Internet was a 
telecommunications component and that cable modem service providers used 
this telecommunications component to transmit Internet service to their 
customers.53  However, the Commission determined that whether cable modem 
service providers “offer” telecommunications “turn[ed] on the nature of the 
functions the end user is offered.”54  The Commission found that the high-
speed wire was always used in connection with the information processing 
capabilities that were provided by Internet access.55  In other words, the 
connection between end-users’ computers and cable modem service providers 
was used to access the World Wide Web, e-mail, and other services “rather 
than ‘transparently’ to transmit and receive ordinary-language messages 
without computer processing or storage of the message.”56  Hence, the 
Commission concluded that the transmission component of cable modem 
service was not offered in a manner that was separate from the data-processing 
capabilities of cable modem service.57  Rather, the Commission determined, 
“[a]s provided to the end user[,] the telecommunications is part and parcel of 
cable modem service and is integral to its other capabilities.”58  Further, the 
Commission reasoned that the type of facility used was not a dispositive factor 
 
 46. Id. at 4821, ¶ 37. 
 47. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 999. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1000. 
 52. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 7, at 4823, ¶ 39. 
 53. Id. at 4823, ¶ 40. 
 54. Id. at 4822, ¶ 38. 
 55. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 988 (2005). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 7, at 4823, ¶ 39. 
 58. Id. 
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for determining the statutory definition of “telecommunications service” and 
thus, it was irrelevant that cable modem service providers used their own 
facilities.59 
D. The Majority Applied Chevron to the Commission’s Construction 
The Brand X Court held that Chevron applied to their review of the 
Commission’s construction of the Telecommunications Act.60  Under the 
Chevron doctrine, if a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s 
construction is reasonable, a federal court must accept the agency’s 
construction of the statute, even if the court does not believe that it is the best 
statutory interpretation.61 
In reaching the determination that Chevron applied, Justice Thomas, 
writing for the Court, noted that “Congress has delegated to the Commission 
the authority to ‘execute and enforce’ the Communications Act, § 151, and to 
‘prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest 
to carry out the provisions’ of the Act, § 201(b).”62  The Court reasoned that 
these provisions gave the Commission the authority to develop binding legal 
rules, which it properly did in the Declaratory Ruling.63  Therefore, the Court 
concluded, the Chevron doctrine applied.64 
The Court noted that Chevron is a two-step procedure for evaluating 
whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is lawful.65  The first step is 
whether the statute’s plain terms “directly address[] the precise question at 
issue.”66  If the statute is ambiguous, then the second step is whether the 
agency’s construction is “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”67  
If it is a reasonable policy choice, then the court must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation.68 
1. The Court Concluded that the Terminology of the 
Telecommunications Act is Ambiguous 
The Court held that the term “offering” as used in the definition of 
“telecommunications service”69 could have several reasonable interpretations 
 
 59. Id. at 4821, ¶ 35; see 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000) (providing that the definition of 
“telecommunications service” applies “regardless of the facilities used”). 
 60. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. 
 61. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 62. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. 
 63. Id. at 980–81 
 64. Id. at 981. 
 65. Id. at 986. 
 66. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 67. Id. at 845. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). 
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based on the “ordinary meaning of the word ‘offering’”70 and the regulatory 
history of the Telecommunications Act.71  Therefore, the Court concluded, the 
statutory provisions were not unambiguous.72 
a. The “Ordinary Meaning” of the Term “Offering” 
The Court reasoned that although cable modem service providers offer 
consumers an information service via telecommunications, it did not follow “as 
a matter of ordinary language that they also ‘offe[r]’ consumers the high-speed 
data transmission” as a separate component.73  To explain its conclusion, the 
Court analogized cable modem service providers to car dealerships.74  It 
reasoned that based on ordinary language, a car dealership “offers” cars, but it 
does not “offer” the integrated components of a car, i.e., the engine and 
chassis.75  For example, a consumer would say that he had bought his car from 
a car dealership, but not that he had purchased an engine, chassis, steering 
wheel, seats, etc. from the car dealership.76  Though the Court conceded that 
while it was linguistically permissible to say that a car dealership “offers” the 
integrated components, it was not the common understanding.77  The Court 
noted that this discrepancy between the common understanding and the 
linguistic permissibility further supported its conclusion that the term “offer” 
was ambiguous.78 
The Court determined that based on the Commission’s findings, the 
telecommunications component of the Internet service offered by cable modem 
service providers was fully integrated into the finished product.79  The Court 
 
 70. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989 (2005). 
 71. Id.  For example, the respondents argued that cable modem service providers necessarily 
“offer” the underlying telecommunications by transmitting services via telecommunications.  Id.  
However, the Court held that “offering” could also mean a discrete, stand-alone offering of 
telecommunications, “i.e., an offered service that, from the user’s perspective, transmits messages 
unadulterated by computer processing.”  Id. 
 72. Id.  The Court did not reflect much on the legislative history of the Telecommunications 
Act to interpret the statute.  Perhaps the Court purposefully refrained from doing so because the 
legislative history is arguably convoluted and inconclusive.  See generally John D. Podesta, 
Unplanned Obsolescence: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1093 (1996) (arguing that Congress had two competing goals when it created the Act—
deregulation and promoting competition). 
 73. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989. 
 74. Id. at 990. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990. 
 79. Id.  As summarized by the Court, the Commission concluded that cable modem service 
is fully integrated because “[a] consumer uses the high-speed wire always in connection with the 
information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and because the transmission is a 
necessary component of Internet access.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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reasoned that like a car dealership, cable modem service providers offer a 
product, but do not “offer” the individual components of the Internet service.80  
The Court noted that the question of whether a component is fully integrated 
was a factual inquiry that was not always straightforward.81  The Court 
reasoned that this lent further credence to its conclusion that “the statute fails 
unambiguously to classify the telecommunications component of cable modem 
service as a distinct offering.”82 
b. The Regulatory History of the Telecommunications Act 
The Court held that the regulatory history of the Telecommunications Act 
confirmed that the term “telecommunications service” was ambiguous.83  The 
Court found that preceding the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the 
Commission had used the terminology of “basic” and “enhanced” to determine 
whether a certain type of service should be regulated.84  This terminology 
derived from a ruling by the Commission in 1980 known as Computer II.85  
The Court found that Congress had substantially incorporated the meaning of 
the terms “basic” and “enhanced” into the Act’s definitions of 
“telecommunications service” and “information service.” 86  Thus, the Court 
reasoned, “basic service” is the analog to “telecommunications service,” and 
“enhanced service” is the analog to “information service.”87  The Court noted 
that “the Commission defined those terms functionally, based on how the 
consumer interacts with the provided information.”88  The Commission did not 
categorically label a service as “basic” or “enhanced,” but rather conducted a 
factual inquiry.89  The Court reasoned that this regulatory history suggested 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 991.  “[T]he question may not always be straightforward whether, on the one hand, 
an entity is providing a single information service with communications and computing 
components, or, on the other hand, is providing two distinct services, one of which is a 
telecommunications service.”  Id.  (quoting In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 
13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11530, ¶ 60 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report]). 
 82. Id. at 992. 
 83. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 992. 
 84. Id. at 976. 
 85. In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II]. 
 86. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 992.  “Congress passed the definitions in the Telecommunications 
Act against the background of this regulatory history, and we may assume that the parallel terms 
‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service’ substantially incorporated their meaning, 
as the Commission has held.”  Id. (citing In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 
F.C.C.R. 8776, 9179–80, ¶ 788 (1997)); see also Scott Blake Harris et al., Regulating Broadband, 
23 COMM. LAW. 1, 34 (2005) (noting that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not change 
the regulatory framework developed in Computer II). 
 87. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 977. 
 88. Id. at 993. 
 89. Id. 
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that the Telecommunications Act did not unambiguously classify services as 
either “telecommunications services” or “information services.”90 
The Court also noted that the Commission had previously held that “all 
those who provide some form of transmission services are not necessarily 
common carriers.”91  For example, the Commission had previously classified 
non-facilities based Internet service providers as pure information service 
providers who were not subject to common carrier regulation, even though 
non-facilities based Internet service providers transmit their services via 
telecommunications.92  This conflicted with the respondents’ argument that the 
1996 Act unambiguously classified all entities that use telecommunications 
inputs to provide information service as telecommunications carriers.93 
The respondents also argued that under the Computer II rules the 
Commission had regulated facilities-based providers more heavily than non-
facilities based providers.94  While the Court conceded that this was true, it 
reasoned that the Commission had done so because it was concerned that local 
telephone companies would abuse their monopoly power.95  The Court 
reasoned that this policy had not carried over to the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996.96  Thus, it did not follow from the respondents’ argument that the 
Telecommunications Act unambiguously regulated facilities based providers.97 
2. The Court Concluded that the Commission’s Construction was a 
Reasonable Policy Choice 
After the Court concluded that under Step One of Chevron the statutory 
language was ambiguous, the Court then addressed Step Two of Chevron: 
whether the Commission’s interpretation was a reasonable policy choice.98  
The respondents had argued that the Commission’s construction of the 
Telecommunications Act was unreasonable because it could potentially allow 
any communications provider to evade common-carrier regulation by bundling 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (quoting Computer II, supra note 85, at 431, ¶ 122 (emphasis added)); see also 
Computer II, supra note 85, at 435, ¶ 132 (“acknowledg[ing] the existence of a communications 
component” in enhanced service offerings). 
 92. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 993; Universal Service Report, supra note 81, at 11530, ¶ 60, 
11540, ¶ 81. 
 93. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 994–95. 
 94. Id. at 995 (noting that the Commission required “local telephone companies that 
provided enhanced services to offer their wires on a common-carrier basis to competing 
enhanced-service providers”) (citing In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 964, ¶ 4 (1986)). 
 95. Id. at 996. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 997. 
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its telecommunications with an information service.99  For example, the 
respondents had argued that a telephone company could bundle an information 
service like voice mail together with telephone service, and thus avoid 
common-carrier regulation of its telephone service.100  However, the Court 
determined that the Commission’s holding was much narrower than argued by 
the respondents and that a telecommunications service provider could not 
avoid regulation by simply packaging the telecommunications offering with an 
information service offering.101  The Court interpreted the Commission’s 
construction as saying that where a telecommunications input is fully 
integrated, is not separable from the information service, and is integral to the 
capabilities of the information service, it is not a telecommunications 
offering.102  For example, the Court reasoned that when a person makes a 
telephone call, the additional capability of voice-mail would only trivially 
affect the person’s ability to convey and receive information.103  By contrast, 
the Court reasoned, “the high-speed transmission used to provide cable modem 
service is a functionally integrated component of that service because it 
transmits data only in connection with the further processing of information 
and is necessary to provide Internet service.”104  Hence, the Court concluded 
that the adverse consequences cited by the respondents did not follow from the 
Commission’s construction because “the Commission did not say that any 
telecommunications service that is priced or bundled with an information 
service is automatically unregulated.”105 
In addition, the Court noted that the Commission had provided sufficient 
reasoning for its conclusion that DNS was an information service rather than a 
telecommunications service.106  Because the Commission had provided 
sufficient reasoning for its construction and the potential adverse consequences 
were minimal, the Court held that the Commission’s construction was 
reasonable.107  Therefore, the Court determined that the second step of 
Chevron was met and affirmed the Commission’s ruling.108 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 997. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. (citing Declaratory Ruling, supra note 7, at 4823, ¶ 39). 
 103.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 997. 
 104. Id. at 998. 
 105. Id. at 997. 
 106. Id. at 1000–01. 
 107. Id. at 1000. 
 108. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 997. 
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E. Justice Scalia’s Dissent Focused on “What” is Being Offered 
Justice Scalia argued in the dissent that the Commission’s reading of the 
statute was implausible.109  In his analysis, Justice Scalia focused on what 
cable modem service providers offered, rather than the meaning of the term 
“offer,” which the majority had analyzed.110  Justice Scalia determined that the 
issue was “whether the individual components in a package being offered still 
possess sufficient identity to be described as separate objects of the offer, or 
whether they have been so changed by their combination with the other 
components that it is no longer reasonable to describe them in that way.”111  
Ultimately, the dissent found that the telecommunications component of cable 
modem service was not so changed by its combination with the information 
service components and that it was in fact a separate object of the offer.112 
First, Justice Scalia reasoned that while some joint offerings constitute one 
singular offering, like a car dealership offering a car, “it is ridiculous to deny 
that one part of a joint offering is being offered merely because it is not offered 
on a ‘stand-alone’ basis.”113  Justice Scalia used the example of a pizzeria that 
offered pizza and delivery.114  He reasoned that even though the two services 
were packaged together, it was unreasonable to conclude that they were 
inseparable.115  Rather, a reasonable person would conclude that the pizzeria 
was in fact offering two services: (1) pizza and (2) delivery.116 
Justice Scalia reasoned that, like the pizzeria, cable modem service 
providers offer two jointly packaged components: (1) the physical connection 
to the Internet (the telecommunications component) and (2) the Internet 
functionality services (the information service component).117  Justice Scalia 
came to this conclusion by viewing cable modem service from the consumer’s 
point of view.118  He noted that aside from cable modem service, the two most 
common forms of Internet service were dial-up and DSL.119  The dissent found 
that in both dial-up and DSL, “the physical transmission pathway to the 
Internet is sold—indeed, is legally required to be sold—separately from the 
Internet functionality.”120  For example, for dial-up, the telephone company 
provides the physical connection and a separate Internet service provider 
 
 109. Id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 1006. 
 111. Id. at 1006–07. 
 112. Id. at 1008. 
 113.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1007. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 1009. 
 118. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1008–09. 
 119. Id. at 1008. 
 120. Id. 
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provides the functionality.121  Similarly, for DSL the physical component for 
Internet access is not provided by the Internet service provider.122  Thus, the 
dissent concluded, a consumer would assume that cable modem service, like 
dial-up and DSL, consisted of two components: the physical connection to the 
Internet and Internet functionality.123 
Next, the dissent addressed whether the two jointly packaged components 
were inextricably linked or whether they were separable.124  Justice Scalia 
disputed the Court’s conclusion that consumers’ use of the cable companies’ 
DNS, which allows consumers to access third party websites, suggested that 
the telecommunications component was inseparable from the information 
services component.125  Justice Scalia found two reasons to conclude 
otherwise.126  First, Justice Scalia argued that DNS “is scarcely more than 
routing information, which is expressly excluded from the definition of 
‘information service.’”127  Second, Justice Scalia argued that “it is apparently 
possible to sell a telecommunications service separately from, although in 
conjunction with, ISP-like services; that is precisely what happens in the DSL 
context, and the Commission does not contend that it could be done in the 
context of cable.”128  Justice Scalia concluded that the physical connection to 
the Internet (the telecommunications component) and Internet functionality 
(the information services component) were separable, and hence, someone who 
sells cable-modem service “offers” telecommunications.129  Therefore, Justice 
Scalia concluded, because it was unambiguous that cable modem service 
providers offered telecommunications, the Act’s language was unambiguous 
and the Commission’s construction should have been overruled.130 
III.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
In Brand X, the Court determined that under the first step of Chevron, it 
was not clear under the Telecommunications Act whether cable modem service 
providers offered telecommunications in addition to information services.131  
The Court reached this conclusion by looking at first, the ordinary meaning of 
the word “offer” and second, the statute’s regulatory history.132  However, the 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1009. 
 123. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1009. 
 124. Id. at 1012–13. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)). 
 128. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1013. 
 129. Id. at 1014. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. at 986 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. at 989. 
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Court’s application of these two approaches has its shortcomings.  The Court’s 
ordinary meaning analysis is weak because to determine the ordinary meaning 
of the term “offer” it chooses a hypothetical context that is arbitrary and 
irrelevant to cable modem service.  Second, the Court places too much 
emphasis on the statute’s regulatory history.  While regulatory history may be 
a factor for interpreting the language of the Telecommunications Act, placing 
too much emphasis on the regulatory history of the Act hinders its applicability 
to novel technology. 
The best approach for interpreting the applicability of the 
Telecommunications Act to Internet technology and the telecommunications 
industry in general is the dynamic approach.  The dynamic approach is optimal 
because it allows the meaning of a statute to change where the context has 
changed, an important feature for the telecommunications field, where 
technology is ever-changing. 
A. Critique of the Court’s Analysis 
1. The “Ordinary Meaning” Approach 
The Court reasons that the term “offer” is not unambiguous because based 
on ordinary usage and linguistic possibilities, “offer” can have more than one 
interpretation.133  But general usage and linguistic possibilities simply suggest 
that a word possibly could be interpreted differently, not that it should be 
interpreted differently.  Words do not have meaning until they are given a 
context.134  As Professor McGreal has stated, “[A] word’s meaning lies in its 
use.  But word usage alone is not enough to understand a speaker’s words.  
Oftentimes, ordinary usage will identify a range of possible word 
meanings. . . . [C]ontext helps the listener determine the appropriate usage 
under the circumstances.”135  Further, a word may have different meanings 
based on different contexts.136  Thus, the context that is chosen to determine a 
word’s meaning is crucial.  However, the Brand X Court chose an arbitrary, 
irrelevant hypothetical context to determine the meaning of “offer.” 
When words are taken out of context, one “must hypothesize a context to 
make them fully intelligible.”137  In Brand X, when the Court took the term 
“offer” out of the context of the statute, it hypothesized the context of a car 
 
 133. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990. 
 134. See generally Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in 
Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325 (2004) (arguing that ordinary speech should 
have no place in statutory language). 
 135. Id. at 335 (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 336 (noting that “keep off the grass” can have different meanings in different 
contexts). 
 137. Id. at 327. 
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dealership in order to determine its meaning.138  It reasoned that a consumer 
would say that a car dealership offers cars but not the components of the car.139  
Similarly, the Court reasoned, a consumer would say that a cable modem 
service provider offers Internet service, but not the components of Internet 
service.140  But is a car dealership actually like a cable modem service 
provider?  The Court provides no answer for this question and gives no support 
for its choice of hypothetical context.141 
The Court’s analysis of the term “offer” in the context of cars and car 
dealerships is misplaced because cars and car dealerships are not analogous to 
cable modem service and cable modem service providers.142  Internet service is 
a much newer industry than the automobile industry and is constantly 
evolving.  Whereas the basic components of cars have been around for more 
than a hundred years, the basic components of Internet service are constantly 
changing.  In fact, this is the very problem the Court is faced with—applying 
the Act to a technology that is different than any the Court has seen before.  
Another result of constantly changing Internet technology is that consumers 
are less familiar with the components of Internet service143 than the 
components of a car,144 which could suggest that consumers are simply unsure 
of what Internet service providers truly “offer.”  Further, unlike the 
 
 138. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 990–91. 
 141. McGreal criticizes this approach by arguing that it “effectively says to the reader, ‘Trust 
me.  This is the ordinary way people use this word.’  If [t]his usage does not resonate with you, 
there is no way to respond other than, ‘No it isn’t.’  At that point, [the Court’s] only response is, 
‘Yes it is.’  We are left with unarticulated intuition, having no grounds for further debate.”  
McGreal, supra note 134, at 369. 
 142. The dissent’s hypothetical context shares the same weaknesses as the Majority’s 
analysis.  Justice Scalia arbitrarily picks a pizzeria to argue that cable modem service providers 
offer both a telecommunications service and an information service, like a pizzeria offers pizza 
and delivery.  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But Justice Scalia provides 
no support for why he chose the context of a pizzeria and how it is similar to cable modem 
service.  For criticism of Scalia’s use of the ordinary meaning approach in other cases, see 
McGreal, supra note 134, at 355–82. 
 143. Admittedly, consumers are becoming more familiar with basic computer components 
that are tangible, including the CPU, monitor, keyboard, and mouse, and with the tangible 
components of Internet service, like the modem and the use of the Internet itself.  But they are 
much less familiar with Internet components they cannot see—like the DNS, Internet backbone, 
and interconnectivity.  Furthermore, new technology continues to blur what Internet service 
consists of.  For example, with wireless technology, a consumer is able to access the Internet 
without having any “physical” connection, making it even less likely that the consumer 
understands what the components of the Internet are. 
 144. Though there may be many automobile components that consumers are unfamiliar with, 
such as U-joints and relays, most consumers are at least familiar with the major components of 
cars—such as the chassis, steering wheel, battery, air filter, spark plug, and tires—and understand 
the basics of how a car works. 
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components of a car, aside from the computer and modem, the components of 
the Internet are not visible to the consumer, making it difficult for the average 
consumer to visualize the components of the Internet, especially the DNS. 
The Court seems to conclude that because the term “offer” has different 
ordinary meanings in different contexts, it is ambiguous.  But this analysis 
provides little meaningful insight.  Nearly every word in the English language 
can have more than one ordinary meaning, especially when put into dissimilar 
contexts.145  Thus, choosing an appropriate context for determining the 
ordinary meaning of “offer” should have been a crucial part of the Court’s 
ordinary meaning analysis.146 
Instead of using a car dealership as its hypothetical context, the Court 
should have used a context that is more similar to cable modem service.  In 
particular, the Brand X Court should have used DSL providers as its 
hypothetical context.  DSL providers are much more similar to cable modem 
service providers than is a car dealership.  Like DSL, cable modem service is a 
type of broadband Internet service.  Like DSL, cable modem service is a new 
technology.  Thus, the context of DSL is relevant to cable modem service 
providers and would have provided a more meaningful interpretation of the 
ordinary meaning of “offer.” 
After grounding its choice of context by comparing DSL to cable modem 
service, the Court should have then determined what the ordinary meaning of 
the term “offer” is for DSL and whether this ordinary meaning sheds any light 
onto the ordinary meaning of the term “offer” for cable modem service.  The 
Court could have noted that the Commission had previously found that DSL 
providers “offer” telecommunications as well as information service because 
DSL travels over telephone lines, which historically have been subject to 
regulation.  Whether or not this proves that the term “offer” is unambiguous is 
another question, though.  One could argue that the term “offer” is ambiguous 
in these contexts because unlike DSL, cable modem service travels over cable 
lines, which historically have not been subject to regulation.  Therefore, 
despite other similarities, the term “offer” might have a different meaning for 
DSL than for cable modem service, and because there could be a difference, 
the meaning of the term offer is ambiguous.  Or, one could argue that even 
though cable modem service travels over cable as opposed to telephone wire, 
both mediums are capable of handling different types of data: cable wire can 
transmit cable modem service signals and cable television signals, while 
telephone wire can transmit data signals and voice signals.  Either conclusion 
would have been more persuasive than the one chosen by the Court because its 
 
 145. McGreal, supra note 134, at 331–35. 
 146. Some scholars have argued that ordinary meaning should play no role in statutory 
interpretation.  See, e.g., id. 
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reasoning would have been grounded in a relevant and meaningful 
hypothetical context. 
2. Criticisms of Regulatory History Analysis 
The Court reached the proper conclusion when it determined that the 
regulatory history of the Act did not suggest that the provisions were 
unambiguous.147  However, a regulatory history analysis should not be a 
predominant consideration when interpreting the Telecommunications Act.  
The problem with placing too much emphasis on the regulatory history of 
hybrid services to determine the applicability of the Act to new technology is 
that the Commission created those rules for technology that is now outdated, or 
will very soon be outdated,148 and could be fundamentally different from 
current technology.  Further, the policies that influenced the Commission on a 
particular decision may have changed.  Thus, an analysis of regulatory history 
prevents the Court from acknowledging the different contexts in which the 
statutory language may have been interpreted and hinders the statute from 
adapting to new policies and new technology. 
B. Alternative Approaches 
Under the first step of Chevron, “deference to [an agency’s] statutory 
interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial construction have 
been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent.”149  There 
are three alternatives to the Court’s ordinary meaning approach and regulatory 
history analysis that were not exhausted: purposivism, originalism, and 
dynamism.  While each of these approaches has its respective strengths and 
weaknesses, dynamism is the best approach for interpreting the 
Telecommunications Act because its inquiry is broader than purposivism and 
originalism.  Perhaps most importantly, dynamism considers current context, 
which is an important factor for a field that is constantly evolving and 
outgrowing the context in which the statute was originally enacted. 
This casenote circumscribes its discussion of statutory interpretation to the 
Telecommunications Act.  It does not address whether the dynamic approach 
 
 147. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 992. 
 148. Gordon Moore, founder of Intel, once asserted that computing power doubles every 
eighteen months.  Podesta, supra note 72, at 1095.  If this proposition, known as Moore’s Law, 
holds true, then computing technology has increased nearly sevenfold since the 
Telecommunications Act was signed into law in 1996. 
 149. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); see also 
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–04 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas argued, 
“Just as we exhaust the aid of the ‘traditional rules of statutory construction’ before deferring to 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute, so too should we exhaust those tools before deciding that a 
statute is ambiguous and that an alternative plausible construction of the statute should be 
adopted.”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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should be applied to all issues involving technology, partly because 
“technology” is a fairly nebulous term which can encompass many different 
areas.150  Such a discussion is beyond the breadth of this article.  Another issue 
that this casenote does not address is whether the dynamic approach should be 
used to interpret statutes other than the Telecommunications Act.  Again, the 
answer to this question is beyond the breadth of this note.151 
1. Purposivism 
For much of United States history, purposivism has been the predominant 
approach to statutory interpretation.152  However, it has recently lost ground to 
other theories of interpretation.153  Under purposivism, the interpreter construes 
the statute broadly to affect its statutory purpose.  The steps of purposivism are 
as follows: 
1. Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any 
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then 
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out 
the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the 
words either—(a) a meaning they will not bear, or (b) a meaning which would 
violate any established policy of clear statement.154 
Further, purposivism holds that the purpose of a statute “is evidenced in the 
language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of 
purpose.”155 
The fatal flaw for purposivism as an approach to interpreting the 
Telecommunications Act is that the Act has no clear purpose, especially for 
 
 150. For example, “technology” may refer to manufacturing equipment, medical devices in a 
hospital, or any number of other things. 
 151. I believe that dynamism deserves due consideration for other statutes as well, 
particularly for those that involve the consideration of cultural norms because, like the 
telecommunications field, cultural norms are constantly changing.  For example, dynamism may 
be an effective approach for interpreting obscenity laws because the meaning of “obscene” has 
changed throughout the years.  What a reasonably well-informed person one hundred years ago 
would have thought was obscene might not be what a person today would think is obscene.  For 
similar reasons, the issue of gay marriage may be suited for the dynamic approach.  Society 
naturally changes and the people of today should not be restricted by past generations separated 
by time, values, and understandings. 
 152. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposovists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 71 (2006).  The use of purposovism dates back more than a hundred years.  See, e.g., Church 
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 153. See Manning, supra note 152, at 71–76. 
 154. Michael Rosensaft, The Role of Purposivism in the Delegation of Rulemaking Power to 
the Courts, 29 VT. L. REV. 611, 612 (2005). 
 155. Id. at 611 (citation omitted).  For current trends in purposivism, see generally Manning, 
supra note 152. 
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Internet technology.  The statutory language gives little guidance156 and the 
external manifestations of purpose are contradictory.157  For example, when 
signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law, President Clinton stated 
that the new legislation was to “reform our telecommunications laws in a 
manner that leads to competition and private investment, promotes universal 
service and open access to information networks, and provides for flexible 
government regulation.”158  However, promoting competition and deregulation 
are competing goals.159  Because there is no clear statutory purpose, 
purposivism is not a useful statutory approach for the Telecommunications Act 
or for the Brand X case in particular. 
2. Original Meaning Approach 
For the purposes of this casenote, “originalism” refers to the original 
meaning approach, as opposed to the original intent approach.  The original 
meaning approach focuses exclusively on the objective meaning of a statute’s 
text, while the original intent approach focuses on the subjective intent of the 
drafters, which may include legislative history and other sources besides the 
text of the statute.160  Thus, when this casenote uses the term “originalism,” 
it is in reference to the original, non-idiosyncratic meaning of words and 
phrases in the [statute]: how the words and phrases, and structure (and 
sometimes even the punctuation marks!) would have been understood by a 
hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and 
 
 156. The Act itself reads: 
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire 
and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, 
without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, 
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with 
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the 
purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio 
communications, and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this policy 
by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting 
additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio 
communication, there is created a commission to be known as the “Federal 
Communications Commission”, which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and 
which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter. 
47 U.S.C. § 151. 
 157. See Podesta, supra note 72, at 1094. 
 158. Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 188, 188 
(Feb. 8, 1996). 
 159. See Podesta, supra note 72, at 1094. 
 160. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003). 
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phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and 
linguistic community in which they were adopted.161 
Further, an originalist would turn to current practices to understand a statute 
only where (1) the statute’s original public meaning is ambiguous and (2) the 
statute’s original public meaning is best understood to designate current 
practices as the proper means for resolving ambiguity.162 
Justice Scalia, who has been called the “patron saint” of originalism,163 
employed the original meaning approach in the Brand X dissent.  In his dissent, 
Justice Scalia tried to determine the objective meaning of the provisions by 
framing the issue as “whether the individual components in a package being 
offered still possess sufficient identity to be described as separate objects of the 
offer, or whether they have been so changed by their combination with the 
other components that it is no longer reasonable to describe them in that 
way.”164  To determine this objective meaning, Justice Scalia first compared a 
cable modem service provider to a pizzeria, but like the majority, Justice 
Scalia’s hypothetical context also lacks relevancy.  Just because a pizzeria may 
offer both pizza and delivery does not necessarily mean that a reasonable 
person would conclude that a cable modem service provider offers both 
telecommunications and information services.  Indeed, the majority criticized 
Scalia’s analogy: 
We also do not share the dissent’s certainty that cable modem service is so 
obviously like pizza delivery service. . . . For example, unlike the transmission 
component of Internet service, delivery service . . . [is] not an integral 
component[] of the finished product. . . . One can pick up a pizza rather than 
having it delivered.165 
Justice Scalia’s comparison of cable modem service to DSL and dial-up is 
much more on target than his pizzeria analogy.  He grounds the comparison by 
arguing that a reasonable consumer would compare cable modem service to 
 
 161. Id.; see also Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 21, 22 
(1988) (“I use ‘wooden originalism’ to describe an interpretative method in which one identifies 
the ordinary meanings that the Constitution’s words, read in linguistic, structural, and historical 
context, had at the time of the document’s origin.”). 
 162. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . And Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1829 
(1997) (comparing the Constitution to a recipe for fried chicken, and arguing that “the practice of 
cooks (whether original or modern) is constitutive of the recipe’s meaning only (1) when the 
recipe’s original public meaning on some point is ambiguous and (2) the recipe’s original 
meaning is best understood to designate practice (whether immediate or distant) as the proper 
means for resolving ambiguity”). 
 163. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 160, at 1139.  For Justice Scalia’s personal insight into 
statutory interpretation, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997). 
 164. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1006–07 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 992 (majority opinion). 
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DSL and dial-up in determining whether cable modem service consisted of a 
separate telecommunications component because those are the services that a 
reasonable consumer is familiar with.166  This reasoning provides sufficient 
grounds for the comparison.  Justice Scalia’s conclusion—that a reasonable 
person would determine that like DSL, cable modem service consists of a 
separate telecommunications component—is similarly well-grounded and 
objective. 
Although Justice Scalia’s original meaning approach may have worked 
well in Brand X, its applicability and relevance to future cases involving the 
Telecommunications Act will diminish in the future.  The problem with the 
original meaning approach is that when the Act was signed into law, Internet 
technology as well as other technology in the telecommunications field was 
very new, and many of the legislators who signed it into law were unfamiliar 
with the Internet.167  In 1996, there were only 47 million Internet users in the 
United States.168  By 2000, only four years later, there were approximately 124 
million users, which was about 44.1% of the United States population.169  And, 
as of January 2007, there were 210 million users, which is about 70% of the 
United States population.170  Needless to say, Internet use and familiarity with 
the Internet has grown exponentially since 1996.  In 1996, the average person’s 
understanding of Internet technology would be primitive compared to the 
average person of 2007, and this trend will continue.  Despite this, the 
originalist would use the original understanding, albeit primitive and limited, 
to determine how technology of the future should be regulated.  This approach 
has the dangerous potential of greatly limiting technological advancement by 
trying to push new technology into a practically obsolete framework.  The 
technology of tomorrow will be vastly different than technology of 1996, and 
 
 166. Id. at 1008 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 167. See Podesta, supra note 72, at 1109. 
Congress conceptualized the Net as little more than something that arrives at your e-mail 
box in a plain brown wrapper.  Congress failed to appreciate the power of the Net, the 
power to enable individuals, the power to democratize, the power to create new publishers 
and broadband producers, the power to narrowcast and create small but viable audiences, 
and the power to be interactive.  All of these powers were lost on legislators who simply 
had never been to cyberspace.  What is more, Congress failed to understand the potential 
of the Net to deconstruct the existing industry structure.  Aside from hooking up schools 
and libraries, and with the rather major exception of censorship, Congress simply 
legislated as if the Net were not there. 
Id. 
 168. See Center Span, What Is the Internet?, http://www.centerspan.org/tutorial/net.htm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 169. See Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.internetworld 
stats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 170. See Internet World Stats, Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
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yet, an originalist would try to understand the technology of tomorrow by 
comparing it to the technology of yesterday even though there may be no 
meaningful comparison.171  As one scholar has noted, “as the distance between 
enactment and interpretation increases, a pure originalist inquiry becomes 
impossible and/or irrelevant.”172 
In rebuttal, an originalist may argue that the provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act are terms of art that by their nature change with 
technology. An originalist might argue that by making the terms 
“telecommunications” and “information service” fairly ambiguous, it was 
Congress’s attempt to allow the Act to adapt to new technology.  However, an 
originalist must still acknowledge the possibility that any real distinction 
between these two terms may cease to exist as the telecommunications field 
grows and technologies within it continue to merge.  In response, an originalist 
may argue that even if the line between “telecommunications” and 
“information service” becomes indistinct, it is still the Court’s duty to follow 
through on the original meaning of the statutory language.  If the terms become 
practically merged, it simply means that Congress chose ineffective 
terminology.  And, if Congress is unsatisfied with the Court’s interpretation, 
Congress should clean up the Act’s terminology. 
Though an originalist should be applauded for his consistency, relying on 
Congress to fix the Court’s interpretation if Congress is unsatisfied with it 
ignores one of the basic tenets of the telecommunications industry—that it 
quickly changes.  Congress, on the other hand, acts very slowly.  Furthermore, 
“[e]rror in legislation is common, and never more so than when technology is 
galloping forward.”173  Congress moves too slowly to address present 
technological issues.  In order to encourage advancements in the 
telecommunications industry, therefore, the Court should consider current 
context.  In contrast, an originalist would rather try to fit a square peg (new 
technology) into a round hole (original meaning) than acknowledge that the 
context in which the Act was originally understood has changed so much that 
the original meaning has become meaningless. 
3. Dynamic Interpretation 
The dynamic approach was first introduced in 1987 by William N. 
Eskridge, Jr.174  Eskridge’s thesis was that statutes should be interpreted 
 
 171. However, where there is a meaningful comparison between old technology and current 
technology and the Court is able to explain why it is meaningful, no problem will arise. 
 172. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 6 (1994). 
 173. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 215 (1996). 
 174. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 
(1987). 
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dynamically.175  The dynamic approach “holds that a statute’s meaning is not 
tied to the framer’s original understanding but is permitted to evolve in 
response to both linguistic and social change.”176  Those in favor of dynamic 
interpretation argue that statutes should be interpreted in reference to their 
present societal, political, and legal context.177  Thus, according to dynamism, 
“statutory language must grow and adapt in response to changing social 
conditions.”178  Dynamism may include consideration of the historical political 
culture in addition to present circumstances.179 
The dynamic approach stands in stark contrast to the original meaning 
approach.180  Originalism addresses the meaning of the text as it was originally 
understood at the time the statute was enacted,181 while dynamism addresses 
the meaning of the text as it is currently understood.182  In other words, 
“[w]here the originalist sees the [original meaning] as the only legitimate goal 
of interpretation, proponents of dynamic interpretation . . . feel that a law 
should be interpreted by reference to contemporary ideals, with little or no 
attention paid to legislative intent [or original meaning].”183 
According to Professor Anna Lumelsky, the originalist approach “fails 
because the drafting legislature cannot consider every issue that may come up 
in relation to a statute.”184  As time passes and society changes, new variations 
of the problem which the statute was meant to address are generated, and 
unanticipated gaps and ambiguities of the statute proliferate.185  In turn, these 
gaps lead an originalist “to produce out-of-date and counter-productive 
statutory interpretations that do not do justice to the legislature’s interests in 
enacting the statute.”186  According to Professor Lumelsky, “[o]nly through 
 
 175. See id. at 1481.  Eskridge has argued both that interpreters have in fact interpreted 
statutes dynamically and that they should interpret statutes dynamically.  See ESKRIDGE, supra 
note 172, at 5–6. 
 176. Randall N. Graham, A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 23 STATUTE L. REV. 
91, 104 (2002) (internal quotation omitted). This thesis was originally asserted by William 
Eskridge in 1987.  See Eskridge, supra note 174, at 1484. 
 177. Eskridge, supra note 174, at 1482–83. 
 178. Graham, supra note 176, at 105. 
 179. “[S]tatutory interpretation is multifaceted and evolutive rather than single-faceted and 
static, involves policy choices and discretion by the interpreter over time as she applies the statute 
to specific problems, and is responsive to the current as well as the historical political culture.”  
ESKRIDGE, supra note 172, at 48. 
 180. See Graham, supra note 176, at 92 (reasoning that originalism and dynamism are 
“mutually contradictory theories of statutory construction”). 
 181. See Lawson, supra note 162, at 1832. 
 182. See Graham, supra note 176, at 92. 
 183. Id. at 104. 
 184. Anna Lumelsky, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Gauging Congress’s Response to Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation by the Supreme Court, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 673 (2005). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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dynamic statutory interpretation can the judiciary properly advance the 
legislature’s vision and ‘contribute to the legitimacy of our government.’”187 
The dynamic approach works particularly well for the 
Telecommunications Act because technology within the telecommunications 
field and circumstances surrounding the telecommunications field are 
constantly changing, rendering old understandings obsolete.188  However, the 
theory that the dynamic approach should be used to interpret the 
Telecommunications Act is not a “Law of the Horse”189 or a form of Internet 
exceptionalism.190  The theory behind Internet exceptionalism is that the 
Internet is different than other property and that it should operate in its own 
legal sphere under its own legal theories.191  This casenote is not arguing for or 
against Internet exceptionalism.192  Rather, the proposal of this casenote is 
 
 187. Id. (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479, 1480 (1987)). 
 188. Professor Anna Lumelsky has applied the dynamic approach to bio-medical patent law.  
Lumelsky analyzed the Supreme Court decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which the 
Supreme Court held that living organisms can be patented.  Id.  Professor Lumelsky’s thesis is 
that 
in science- and technology-related cases in which outdated legal rules could significantly 
hamper the advancement of the field, the Supreme Court should interpret federal statutes 
dynamically in response to a changing social context, but should also attempt to conform 
its interpretations to legislative preferences in order to avoid a legislative override. 
Id. at 641. 
 189. See generally Karl Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939) 
(arguing that the law of Sales should be unified and that specific areas, i.e., the sale of horses, 
should not have their own unique set of laws); Karl Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse 
Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939) (same). 
 190. Internet exceptionalism is similar to intellectual property exceptionalism.  For arguments 
against intellectual property isolationism, see John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism 
and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1089–90 (2005). 
 191. See John W. Bagby, Cyberlaw: A Forward, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 521 (2002). 
 192. There are plenty of arguments on both sides of the fence.  Bagby notes: 
Some scholars argue that cyberspace should be relatively free of legal restraint imposed 
by traditional law.  These Cyberlaw revolutionaries are urging “Internet exceptionalism.”  
They argue that the Internet represents a revolution of even greater impact than the 
printing press, industrialization, electronic communications or computerization.  The 
Internet, they argue, is different in kind, not merely in degree, so that it deserves 
revolutionary forbearance from existing law. 
Id. at 523.  He goes on to explain: 
Opponents of . . . revolutionary approaches to Cyberlaw argue that public policy should 
not exempt cyberspace from social, political and legal/regulatory institutions.  They offer 
three main reasons.  First, public-policymaking in Cyberlaw by non-practitioners risks 
poor results.  Second, a separate field of Cyberlaw is unnecessary and unlikely to be 
rigorous.  Third, revolutionary regulation of cyberspace offends libertarian ideals.  
Opponents also suspect that simply recognizing a new field of Cyberlaw would encourage 
Internet exceptionalism. 
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broader than Internet exceptionalism. If anything, it argues for 
“telecommunications exceptionalism”—that the telecommunications field is a 
unique industry, and that the law should reflect this uniqueness.  By drafting 
the Telecommunications Act, Congress implicitly supported this notion.  
Instead of relying on property law or other law to govern the 
telecommunications field, Congress felt it necessary to create laws specific to 
the telecommunications industry.  Considering that Congress acknowledged 
the uniqueness of the telecommunications industry, it is not much of a stretch 
to argue that the framework for interpreting the laws governing the 
telecommunications industry should also reflect this uniqueness.  Furthermore, 
this casenote is not proposing that dynamism should necessarily be limited to 
the Telecommunications Act. 
New technology in the telecommunications field has blurred the line 
between whether a service is a “pure” transmission or one that has been 
altered.  Thus, it is necessary to have a certain degree of flexibility, which the 
dynamic approach allows for.  Without flexibility, future technology in the 
telecommunications industry will cause irresolvable problems for other forms 
of statutory interpretation, including originalism.  For example, in 1996, to the 
reasonably well-informed person, it was clear that voice data was transmitted 
only over telephone lines.  But ten years later, voice internet protocol (VoIP) 
has become a reality.193 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), is a technology that allows you to make 
telephone calls using a broadband Internet connection instead of a regular (or 
analog) phone line.194 
Whether VoIP is a “telecommunications” offering or an “information 
service” offering must still be decided.195  If the issue were to reach the courts, 
an originalist may simply compare VoIP to traditional phone service and to e-
mail and determine which service it is more similar to.  If it is closer to 
traditional phone service, then it is a “telecommunications service” and should 
 
Id. at 524; see also Sasha Shepperd & Deborah Charnock, Against Internet Exceptionalism, 324 
BMJ 556 (2002), available at http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/324/7337/556. 
 193. There are numerous VoIP companies, including Vonage.com, SunRocket.com, and 
Covad.com. 
 194. See Federal Communications Commission, Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau, 
IP-Enabled Services, http://www.fcc.gov/voip (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 195. For a discussion on the regulation of VoIP, see Werbach, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that 
“new technologies such as . . . VoIP create both regulatory uncertainty and significant economic 
dislocations”). 
In many ways, VoIP is a microcosm of the broad array of telecommunications regulatory 
issues that have been debated since passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
including the role of state regulators, the legal classification of services, universal service, 
access charges, emergency services and access by people with disabilities. 
Dinkes, supra note 4, at 837. 
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be regulated, and if it is closer to e-mail, it is an “information service” and 
should not be regulated.  But comparisons only to technology that existed 
when the Act was first signed into law may leave an originalist feeling lost.  
Like telephone service, VoIP functions as a voice communications medium.196  
Like e-mail, VoIP transmits data packets over the Internet.197  The originalist 
approach fails to consider the bigger picture, including that VoIP may be so 
different from traditional telephone service and e-mail that comparisons are 
meaningless.198 
Under the dynamic approach, the interpreter may consider current context 
and current understandings of VoIP to determine if it is a telecommunications 
or information service.  These considerations will make the statutory 
interpretation not only more relevant to today, but to tomorrow as well.  Like 
VoIP, which merges computer technology and voice data transfer, different 
mediums will continue to merge, and if current values and understandings are 
not considered, the Telecommunications Act will be frozen in time, thereby 
stifling technological advancements. 
A potential concern may be that the dynamic approach is too flexible, and 
that a decision may be rendered based on a judge’s personal policy 
preferences.  However, this concern is minimized by Chevron.  Under Step 
One of Chevron, the Court’s only role is to determine whether the statutory 
language is clear.199  To do this, the Court does not consider policy issues.  
Under the dynamic approach, the judge could consider a number of factors, 
including the statutory text itself, specific legislative intent, imaginative 
reconstruction, legislative purpose, evolution of the statute, and current context 
and values.200  The most concrete considerations, like text, would outweigh 
more abstract ones, like the evolution of the statute and current values.201  
Dynamism is not restricted by focusing solely on the purpose of the statute or 
on its original meaning.  Rather, these two considerations are factors, not the 
sole sources of analysis.  Under Step Two of Chevron, the Court considers 
policy in its analysis,202 but the issue is whether the Commission’s 
 
 196. R. Alex DuFour, Comment, Voice Over Internet Protocol: Ending Uncertainty and 
Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471, 472 
(2005). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Perhaps “VoIP is an innovation superceding current regulations and cannot be 
shoehorned into one category or meshed into both.”  Id.  Unfortunately, this insight does not help 
interpret the Act as it is currently written. 
 199. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 200. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 250 
(2d ed. 2006).  But see id. at 335–37 (noting that there remains the question of what courts should 
consult in determining whether a statute is unclear under Chevron). 
 201. See id. at 250. 
 202. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
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interpretation was reasonable, not whether it was the best interpretation, so the 
Court’s policy analysis is fairly limited.203 
If the Brand X Court had interpreted the Telecommunications Act 
dynamically, the scope of its analysis would have been broader.  Under Step 
One of its Chevron analysis, it first would have considered the text of the 
statute.  To interpret the statute’s text it would have considered the ordinary 
meaning of the statutory provisions, similar to the majority.  But unlike the 
majority opinion, the ordinary meaning analysis would not be limited to 
dictionary definitions and irrelevant comparisons.  Rather, it would have 
considered current context and chosen meaningful comparisons.  Like the 
dissent, it would have compared cable modem service to comparable services, 
like DSL.  Like the dissent concluded, a reasonable person would view DSL 
and cable modem service as similar services.  Thus, under the statutory text 
factor, it would have determined that the statute called for the regulation of 
cable modem service.  However, under the multi-factor dynamic approach, this 
factor is not dispositive.  The Court also would have looked at legislative 
intent.  As already discussed, this factor would have been fairly 
inconclusive.204 
Next, the Court also would have considered how the enacting legislators 
would have wanted the statute to apply to the facts of the case.205  This has 
been called “imaginative reconstruction.”206  Again, as already discussed, this 
factor, as well as the legislative purpose factor, are fairly inconclusive.207  Like 
the majority’s legislative history analysis, the Court would have looked at the 
evolution of the statute.  Unlike the majority’s opinion, however, it would have 
been one of several factors, and, given its lack of concreteness, its 
persuasiveness would have been minimal.  Finally, the Court would have 
looked at current values, but because this factor leans towards policy, which is 
circumscribed by Step One of Chevron, and because the current values factor 
is fairly abstract, it would not have provided much guidance for Step One.  
Thus, the Court would have been left with balancing the unambiguousness of 
the text versus the ambiguity of the other factors for deciding Step One of 
Chevron.  Given that the statutory text is not entirely clear, the Court probably 
would have concluded that that statute was ambiguous under Step One of 
Chevron.  Under Step Two, the Court would have considered current values, 
but given the Court’s strong preference under Chevron to defer to the 
 
 203. Eskridge has noted that “the Supreme Court has given little guidance as to the proper 
application of Step Two.”  ESKRIDGE, supra note 200, at 338. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 155–58. 
 205. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983). 
 206. Manning, supra note 152, at n.114. 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 155–58. 
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Commission, it probably would have concluded the Commission’s 
construction was reasonable. 
Though the Court would have come to the same conclusion—that the 
statutory text was ambiguous—using the dynamic approach would not have 
been fruitless.  Like other Supreme Court decisions, the Brand X case provides 
precedent for courts deciding future cases.  As a result of Brand X, courts may 
focus exclusively on the ordinary meaning and legislative history of the 
Telecommunications Act, rather than taking a broader dynamic approach.  As 
already discussed, these two approaches will provide little guidance as the 
telecommunications field continues to grow. 
The dynamic approach may draw some criticisms.  A concern is that it 
would lead to the judiciary creating law, rather than interpreting law, which 
could lead to legislative override.  While this concern is legitimate, it would be 
minimized if the Court attempted to conform its interpretation to legislative 
preferences.208  Another concern is that it could create ambiguities where none 
originally existed.  This result is not necessarily negative, though.  If an 
ambiguity is created where none previously existed, Congress specifically gave 
the Commission the discretion to determine how the Act should be applied, 
and under Chevron, the Court must defer to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has been passed by 
technology and needs to be updated by Congress.209  In the meantime, the 
courts are left to sort out decisions by the Commission and interpret the 
language of the Act.  In Brand X, the Court held that under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, it was ambiguous whether cable modem 
service providers offer a telecommunications component.210  The Court 
reached this conclusion by using an ordinary meaning approach and by looking 
at the Act’s regulatory history.211  However, these two sources of interpretation 
 
 208. Lumelsky, supra note 184, at 641. 
 209. See Scott Blake Harris et al., Regulating Broadband, COMM. LAW., Summer 2005, at 1, 
39.  Harris and his colleagues argue: 
The story of broadband regulation is a lesson in how technology can move faster than 
regulation and how regulation attempts to catch up.  It is also a lesson about how long 
regulatory change can take when the stakes are high.  What is even clearer, however, is 
that we are in a new era defined, at least for now, by great uncertainty. 
Id.; see also, Werbach, supra note 2, at 78 (arguing that “[t]he root problem the FCC faces . . . is 
that there is simply no good answer under the current regulatory framework. . . . Either something 
is ‘telecommunications’—and subject to the full panoply of FCC regulation—or it is information 
service—and thus in a vaguely defined zone of ‘unregulation’”). 
 210. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989 (2005). 
 211. Id. 
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are weak because the telecommunications industry is constantly changing, as is 
the context surrounding it.  Three alternatives to the Court’s approaches 
include purposivism, originalism, and dynamism.  Purposivism fails because 
the Act has no clear purpose for telecommunications, and in particular for 
Internet technology.  Originalism fails because it is backward-looking and the 
telecommunications industry is forward-looking.  Dynamism is the best 
approach because like the telecommunications field, it welcomes change. 
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